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Intrusion Detection method 
Based on Nonlinear Correlation 
Measure 
Abstract- Cyber crimes and malicious network activities 
have posed serious threats to the entire internet and its users. 
This issue is becoming more critical, as network-based 
services, are more widespread and closely related to our 
daily life. Thus, it has raised a serious concern in individual 
internet users, industry and research community. A 
significant amount of work has been conducted to develop 
intelligent anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) to address this issue. However, one technical 
challenge, namely reducing false alarm, has been along with 
the development of anomaly-based IDSs since 1990s. In this 
paper, we provide a solution to this challenge. A Nonlinear 
Correlation Coefficient (NCC) based similarity measure is 
proposed to help extract both linear and nonlinear 
correlations between network traffic records. This extracted 
correlative information is used in our proposed IDS to 
detect malicious network behaviours. The effectiveness of 
the proposed NCC-based measure and the proposed IDS are 
evaluated using NSL-KDD data set. The evaluation results 
demonstrate that the proposed NCC-based measure not only 
helps reduce false alarm rate, but also helps discriminate 
normal and abnormal behaviours efficiently. 
Keywords-Intrusion Detection; Nonlinear Correlation 
Coefficient (NCC); Mutual Information (MI);  
I. Introduction 
Network technologies have made significant progress in 
development, while the security issues alongside with these 
technologies have not been well addressed. Current research 
on network security mainly focuses on developing 
preventative measures, such as security policies and secure 
communication protocols. Meanwhile, attempts have been 
made to protect computer systems and networks against 
malicious behaviours by using Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs). Clearly, the collaboration of IDSs and preventative 
measures can provide a safe and secure communication 
environment. 
Intrusion detection has been a hot topic since 1990s. 
Intrusion detection techniques can be generally classified 
into two main categories: signature-based and anomaly-
based detection. Signature-based or misuse-based detection 
systems detect on-going anomalies by looking for a match 
with any pre-defined attack signature (Vigna and 
Kemmerer, 1998). Signature-based detection systems can 
identify types of malicious attacks based on the pre-defined 
signatures and even activate responses to some particular 
intrusions. These systems are widely used because they are 
simple and efficient. More importantly, they have a small 
number of false positive alarms. Bro is a well-known 
example, and it is a stand-alone system for monitoring real-
time traffic and detecting incoming intrusions (Paxson, 
1999). However, one of the disadvantages of these systems 
is that the detection accuracy and efficiency heavily depend 
on the quality of attack signatures. Furthermore, to extract 
such high quality signatures, it requires the involvement of 
experts in extensive study of malicious behaviours, which is 
costly and time consuming. Moreover, the signature of an 
intrusion is required before the system can detect the 
respective. Consequently, this type of IDS cannot detect any 
previously unknown attacks due to the lack of attack 
signatures. 
The second category is anomaly-based detection systems, 
which has been in favour of research community. Anomaly-
based detection makes an assumption that intruders’ 
behaviours are different from those of normal network 
traffic (Hassanzadeh and Sadeghian, 2008). Therefore, 
intrusions can be defined as network traffic patterns that do 
not confirm the expected pattern of normal traffic behaviour 
(Barford et al., 2002). In comparison with signature-based 
detection systems, anomaly-based detection systems enjoy 
the advantage of detecting unknown attacks and variants of 
known attacks. That is because they make use of statistical 
analysis to evaluate the deviations of the behaviours of 
observed traffic flows from those of the normal traffic. They 
study normal traffic behaviours on a network and then 
create models for normal flows. After that any deviations 
from the normal flows are considered as suspicious 
behaviours.  
Recent research works have widely used machine learning 
techniques to build anomaly-based IDSs. Machine learning 
techniques are capable of improving the performance of 
detection algorithms, namely higher detection rates and 
lower false positive rates. Numerous machine learning 
techniques, including Bayesian network (Kruegel et al., 
2003), Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Ying et al., 2012), 
Mutual Information (Amiri et al., 2011) and Markov models 
(Ye et al., 2004), have been used in anomaly-based 
detection systems. The main advantages of these approaches 
are the ability of recognising known and unknown attacks, 
and no need of continuous update of the attack knowledge 
base. However, the major weaknesses of these techniques 
include that they are prone to high false positive rates with 
newly occurring normal network traffic, and low detection 
rates with attacks that mimic normal network traffic 
behaviours. These limitations encourage us to focus on 
developing anomaly-based detection systems that can 
overcome such weaknesses.  
In this paper, we intend to provide a solution to the 
problem of false positive alarm. Although various 
techniques have been proposed to address this issue in the 
recent decade (Yu, 2012), there is still no perfect solution. 
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a scheme, 
named Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient (NCC) based 
Mutual Information (MI) extraction. It can accurately 
extract the correlation between network traffic records. 
Moreover, our proposed method is sensitive to both linear 
   
correlation and nonlinear correlation. Theoretically, NCC-
based measure is more rational than Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient (PCC) based measures. NCC-based measure can 
help improve the performance of intrusion detection (Shen 
et al., 2011). In addition, to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
our proposed NCC-based measure in extracting the 
correlation between network traffic records, we compare our 
results with the results using the PCC-based scheme. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
conducts a review on the works which are closely related to 
our research. The linear-based correlation (i.e., PCC) 
measure and the nonlinear-based correlation (i.e., NCC) 
measure are introduced in Section III. Section IV proposes 
an intrusion detection algorithm based on correlation 
coefficient measures. Experimental results, analysis and 
performance comparison are given in Section V. Finally, the 
conclusion and future work are presented in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Despite many intrusion detection methods are used to detect 
different types of attacks within networks, reducing false 
positive rate is still a major issue. Over time, large number 
of intrusion detection techniques have been proposed to 
overcome this problem and maintain the reliability of 
networks (Liao et al., 2013). Recent literatures on intrusion 
detection techniques have shown that correlation analysis is 
one of the effective ways to improve the detection ability 
and reduce false positive rate. Next-generation Intrusion 
Detection Expert System (NIDES) was one of the earliest 
statistical intrusion detection algorithms that could operate 
in real-time for continuous monitoring of user activities 
(Anderson et al., 1995). It uses statistical measures to build 
the normal profile and then use this profile to detect 
anomalies. Beauquier and Hu proposed a model named 
Pearson's Correlation Coefficients-Rank (PCC-R), which 
applied PCC to evaluate distances between different known 
methods including Uniqueness, Nave Bayes, Bayes one-step 
Markov and Probabilistic Finite State Automata (PFSA) 
(Beauquier and Hu, 2007). They built their intrusion 
detection model based on the combination of those methods. 
While this model showed improvement in the detection rate, 
the false alarm rates were still high. Jin et al. in (Jin et al., 
2007) utilized covariance matrix of sequential samples to 
detect multiple network attacks. In order to investigate the 
performance of their model, they applied two different 
statistical pattern recognition approaches, namely threshold 
based detection approach and traditional decision tree 
approach, to detect anomalies. Experimental results show 
that both approaches can distinguish multiple known attacks 
in the covariance feature space effectively. However, one of 
the disadvantages of this model is that such a scheme is 
susceptible to any attacks which linearly change the 
monitored features.   
Lately, Anuar et al. proposed a hybrid statistical approach 
using combination of data mining and decision tree 
classification in identifying the false alarms (Anuar et al., 
2008). Hu et al. in 2008 proposed a detection method based 
on AdaBoost algorithm, where decision stumps are used as 
weak classifiers and decision rules are provided for 
categorical and continuous features (Hu et al., 2008). By 
combining the weak classifiers for continuous and 
categorical features into a strong classifier, the relations 
between these two different types of features are handled 
naturally. Their experimental results have shown that this 
method has low false rates.  
Some new ideas were proposed lately to deal with the 
problem of linear changes to the monitored features and to 
reduce false positive rate. Tsai and Lin (Tsai and Lin, 2010) 
proposed a method based on Triangle Area based Nearest 
Neighbours (TANN). TANN combined clustering and 
classification techniques to detect attacks. Compared with 
the previously proposed methods, TANN shows significant 
enhancement in detection rate and false positive rates. 
Jamdagni et al. in (Jamdagni et al., 2010) has proposed a 
Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) model. 
GSAD is a pattern recognition method using Mahalanobis 
Distance Map (MDM) to extract correlations between 
packet payload features. To reduce the processing overhead 
of GSAD model, Tan et al. (2010) proposed a two-tier 
system based on linear discriminant method (Tan et al., 
2010).  More recently, Tan et al. in (Tan et al., 2012) 
proposed an effective Multivariate Correlation Analysis 
(MCA) technique that investigates geometrical correlations 
(triangle areas) between features in a single network traffic 
record.  
However, these approaches either ignore the correlations 
between traffic records or do not take nonlinear correlation 
into account. Considering that in real world communication 
the correlations can also be nonlinear, we propose IDS that 
can measure both linear and nonlinear correlations of 
multiple records which are presented in Section IV. 
III. LINEAR AND NONLINEAR 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
In this section, two correlation analysis methods are 
introduced. They are Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
(PCC) and Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient (NCC). 
Correlation coefficient is a type of statistical measure that 
indicates the magnitude of relationship between the two 
variables. It also shows how the two variables interact with 
each other. 
A. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (PCC) (Rodgers and 
Nicewander, 1988) is one of the basic linear correlation 
methods used to measure dependence between two 
variables. Given two random variables X and Y, shown in 
(1) and (2) respectively, 
1 2{ , , , }nX x x x , (1) 
1 2{ , , , }nY y y y , (2) 
   
where; n  is the total number of samples in X  and Y . The 
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  indicate the 
means of X and Y respectively.  
The value of a PCC is ranged from -1 to 1. It indicates the 
degree of the linear correlation between two random 
variables. As it has been claimed in (Rodgers and 
Nicewander, 1988, Shen et al., 2009), when the PCC value 
is close to 1 or -1, it denotes a strong relationship. If the 
value is close to 0, it means a weak relationship between the 
two variables. A positive correlation coefficient denotes that 
the two variables are in the same direction, and a negative 
one indicates that the two variables are in the opposite 
direction. 
B. Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient 
Although PCC can reveal the linear correlation between two 
dependent random variables, in real world the correlation 
between two variables can be nonlinear. Thus, we need an 
approach to analyze the nonlinear correlation between 
variables.  
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient (NCC) is a method 
based on Mutual Information (MI), which is a quantity 
measuring the relationship between two discrete random 
variables. MI provides a generalized correlation analogous 
to linear correlation coefficient, but it is sensitive to both 
linear and nonlinear correlations (Roulston, 1999). Given 
the same random variables X  and Y , the MI is denoted by 
(4). 
( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( , )I X Y H X H Y H X Y   , (4) 
where ( )H X and ( )H Y are the information entropies of the 
variables X  and Y , which are defined in (5) and (6) 
respectively, 
1




H X P x P x

  , (5) 
1




H Y P y P y

  , (6) 
and ( , )H X Y  is the joint entropy of X and Y shown in (7), 
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ln ( , )
n n
i j i j
i j
H X Y P x y P x y
 
  . (7) 
In (5) and (6), ( )iP x and ( )jP y denote the probabilities that 
the random variable X  is in state ix and the random variable 
Y is in state iy  respectively. In (7), ( , )i jP x y denotes the 
joint probability that X is in state ix  and Y  is in state iy . 
The disadvantage of MI is that it does not range in a 
definite closed interval [-1, 1] as the correlation coefficient 
does (Wang et al., 2005). Therefore, Wang et al. (Wang et 
al., 2005) developed a revised version of the MI, named 
nonlinear correlation coefficient. The revised joint entropy 
of the two variables X  and Y is given by (8). 
1 1








  , (8) 
where b b rank grids are used to place the sample 
pairs {( , )}i jx y , for 1 i n   and 1 j n   , to the rank 
sequences of X  and Y , 
ijn  is the number of samples 
located in the ( , )i j th rank grid, and N is the total number 
of samples. The NCC is defined in (9). 
( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( , )r r rNCC X Y H X H Y H X Y   , (9) 
where ( )
rH X  and ( )rH Y  are the revised entropies of the 




















   (11) 
Therefore, the ( ; )NCC X Y  in (9) can be rewritten into (12). 
1 1








  , (12) 
and describes the correlation between two discrete random 
variables, which is within a definite closed interval [-1, 1] 
where -1 and 1 indicate the weakest and the strongest 
relationships respectively.  
For a multi-record scenario, the correlation matrix S of n  





















The elements of the matrix S are the correlation coefficients 
between distinct pairs of records. The values of elements 
can be obtained using (3) and (12) for linear correlation and 
   
nonlinear correlation respectively. It is noticed that S is a 
symmetric matrix and the elements' value along its diagonal 
are equal to one this is because ij jis s , where i j , 
1 i n    and1 j n   
The aforementioned Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, 
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient and correlation matrix 
S are applied in our intrusion detection algorithm proposed 
in Section IV. 
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION 
BASED ON CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
In this section, we propose an intrusion detection algorithm, 
which can apply Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient and 
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient to extract linear 
correlations and nonlinear correlations of network traffic 
records and form correlation matrices using (13). It is to be 
noticed that our detection algorithm includes two main 
components: normal profile and a pre-defined threshold . 
The process of generating the normal profile and choosing 
the threshold value   are described in the following 
subsections. 
A. Normal Profile Generation Using 
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient  
To determine the similarity between the normal record and 
new incoming record, we separate the detection method into 
two different stages. Firstly, normal profile is built for 
normal records and obtain the mean value of correlation 
coefficient among the normal ones, which can extract the 
linear and nonlinear correlation of the traffic records. 
Secondly, we set threshold value to determine whether the 
new incoming record is normal or not.  
Given a set of m  normal training traffic 
samples 1 2{ , ,..., }
normal normal normal normal
mX x x x , we first 
calculate the NCC using (12), between the n normal records 
and then, generate the correlation matrix S  using (13) for 
the normal records. After that, the mean ncS of each 










  , (14) 
where, h indicates the NCC values in each column in the 
correlation matrix S  and q indicates the row number in 
matrix S .  
The mean 
n
NCC  for the c









  , (16) 
where, g  indicates the number of means in the correlation 
matrix
c
nS .   
B. Threshold Selection 
The selection of the threshold value   is a delicate task 
when designing IDS. It directly influences the false positive 
and detection rates. In other words, larger value of the 
threshold generates less false positive alarms and small 
value of the threshold leads to higher detection rates and 
vice versa. In this paper, the value of the threshold   is 
ranged from 0 to 1.  
In fact, the key point of the method between the PCC 
measure and NCC measure, as explained in section III-A, is 
the correlation between the two variables. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no exact mathematical solution to 
determine the threshold value as the degree of strong or 
weak correlations. Therefore, without loss of generality, we 
can utilize the mean of the two extreme values 1 and 0, i.e., 
0.5, to differentiate the strong and weak correlation of the 
two variables. This value is rational because it is similar to 
the Hurst parameter which is a value to reveal the network 
self-similarity (Rose, 1996). During the training phase we 
have tested various values for the threshold range from 0 to 
1. The experimental result shows that the large threshold 
value leads to less false positive alarm but less detection rate 
as well. Therefore, empirically we found the threshold 
values between 0.1 and 0.5 give higher detection rates and 
low false positive rate. More explanation about the 
threshold selection is given in Section V-B. 
C. Detection Algorithm  
Similar to the normal profile development process, for any 
new incoming record 1n , the , 1n nNCC  between the new 
incoming record and the records in the normal profile is 
calculated using (12). Then, the mean , 1n nNCC  of the 












  , (17) 
where r is the number of NCC values between the new 
incoming record and the normal profile records.      
After that, the difference between the mean of the normal 
profile given in (15) and the mean in (17) is defined as  
, 1n n n
NCC NCC

 , (18) 
Finally, the incoming record is considered as an attack or 
abnormal if the difference between 
n





greater than a pre-defined threshold  or not.  
, 1n n n
NCC NCC 

  , (19) 
The flow chart given in Fig. 1 illustrates the 
aforementioned processes of the detection algorithm. This 
detection algorithm has been applied to PCC as well. The 
   
comparison results between NCC detection algorithm and 
PCC detection algorithm are explained in the next section.  
 
Figure1. The flow chart of the proposed algorithm 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we describe the results obtained by applying 
the proposed algorithm in section IV-C and the selected 
threshold as described in section IV-B and Table IV, to 
detect the normal records and six different types of DOS 
attacks.  We set detection, false positive and accuracy rates 
to evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm.  
A. Data Set Selection 
In this experimentation, NSL-KDD data set 
(http://iscx.ca/NSL-KDD), as an enhanced version of KDD 
Cup 99 data set, is utilized to demonstrate our approach. 
Even though KDD Cup 99 data set is a well-known data set 
and widely used for network-based intrusion detection 
techniques, it contains some problems such as including 
huge number of redundant records, which affect the 
effectiveness of evaluated systems greatly and consequently 
lead to poor detection results. To overcome these issues, 
Tavallaee et al. in (Tavallaee et al., 2009) presented a new 
revised version of KDD Cup 99 termed as NSL-KDD. The 
training and testing data sets of NSL-KDD data set consist 
of about 125,973 and 22,544 connection records, 
respectively. Each record is labeled as either normal or 
attack, and has 41 features. There are 22 types of attacks 
available in the data set. They can be categorized into four 
classes, namely Probe, Denial of Service (DOS), User to 
Root (U2R) and Remote to User (R2U). The attacks 
distribution is listed in Table I. 
TABLE I.  ATTACK DISTRIBUTION IN NSL-KDD DATASET (OLUSOLA ET AL., 
2010)     
B. Experimental Results 
In our experiments, detection and false positive rates are 
used as standard metrics to evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of our algorithm. During the training and 
testing phases, six types of attacks including Smurf, 
Neptune, Land, Teardrop, Back and Pod attacks are 
randomly selected for training and testing. The distribution 
of records of various types in training and testing phases are 
listed in Table II and Table III respectively.   
During the training phase, we have applied both NCC 
measure and PCC measure. By following the proposed 
detection algorithm shown in Fig. 1, we calculate the 
correlation coefficients ( ijs ) between the selected records to 
generate the normal profile using both PCC measure and 
NCC measure respectively. Fig. 2 illustrates the two 
different correlation matrices
PCCS and 
NCCS  of normal 
profiles for the same samples. Each element ijs in the 
matrices describes the linear correlation coefficient or the 
nonlinear correlation coefficient between the i th  and 
j th records. 
(a) Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient-based Correlation Matrix 
(b) Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient-based Correlation Matrix 
Figure 2. Matrices Expressions of Two Different Measures for  Normal 
Profiles 
However, to differentiate normal and abnormal records 
exactly, it is necessary to define the pre-defined sensitive 
threshold σ firstly. To our best knowledge, there is no good 
way to solve this value theoretically. Hence, we adopt the 
conventional method to determine this value by setting 
different values for the threshold. The value varies from 0.1 
to 0.5 with the step length 0.1, and these are discussed in 
Table IV and Fig. 3. Here, we mainly focus on detection and 
false positive rates during the training stage, and it is 
noticed that good detection results depend on   greatly 
when it is neither too small nor too large, such as 0.2   or 
0.3 . From the comparison between the various threshold 
values and results illustrated in Table IV and Fig. 3, 
when 0.3  , the detection rate for normal records 
decreases slightly from 100% to when 0.5   with a 
detection rate of 99.85%. However, the average false 
positive rate between different types of attacks has a 
significant decrease from approximately 3.08 to 0.28 with 
the decrease of  from 0.5 to 0.3. In addition, even though 
there is a slight difference in the detection rate when 
0.3  and 0.1   , the false positive rate between normal 
records when 0.1  is obviously higher than when 0.3  . 
To sum up, it is the best way that we choose 0.3  as a 
fixed threshold value for our detection algorithm.  
Here, we describe the detection method in detail. During 
the test process, the mean correlation coefficient 1,m iNCC   
among each new record and the corresponding normal 
profile which is built based on the normal traffic records is 
calculated. If the distance between mean coefficient of 
normal profile and 1,m iNCC  exceeds the pre-defined 
threshold 0.3  it would be taken into account as abnormal 
record. Otherwise it would be considered as legitimate 
traffic.  
Considering the selected threshold value 0.3 , the 
confusion matrix presented in Table V shows that our 
intrusion detection algorithm using NCC measure achieves 
high accuracy in detecting both normal records (99.84%) 
and attack records (99.55%). 
TABLEII. SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION ON THE TRAINING DATASET 
TABLE III. SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION ON THE TESTING DATASET 
TABLE IV. DETECTION RATE FOR VARIOUS THRESHOLD VALUES ON THE 
TRAINING DATASET 
Figure 3. False positive rate for various threshold values on the training 
dataset 
TABLE V. CONFUSION MATRIX FOR NCC-TRAINING SET 
   
The performance of intrusion detection technique is 
defined by its ability to make correct predictions. 
Comparing an event with the predications from the IDS, 
there are four possible outcomes shown in Table VI. These 
outcomes are known as the confusion matrix. The 
performance comparison between NCC-based IDS and 
PCC-based IDS is given in Section V-C. 
TABLE VI. CONFUSION MATRIX 
C. Performance Comparison and 
Analysis 
The effectiveness of a detection system is defined by 
Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). While 
the DR represents the capability of IDS in detecting attacks, 
the FPR refers to the probability of IDS triggering an alarm 
















     
where 
 True Positives (TP): the number of actual attacks 
classified as attack. 
 True Negatives (TN): the number of actual normal 
classified as normal. 
 False Positives (FP): the number of actual normal 
classified as attack. 
 False Negatives (FN): the number of actual attack 
classified as normal. 
Considering the selected threshold value 0.3  , the 
results presented in Table VII show that during the testing 
phase our detection algorithm achieves higher detection rate 
and lower false positive rate than PCC measure. 
As shown in Table VII the DR of NCC-based IDS 
(98.754%) outperforms the DR of PCC-based and other 
proposed methods. More importantly, for the FPR of NCC-
based IDS (1.246%) also performs better than other 
proposed methods. 
TABLE VII. COMPARISON OF DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM BETWEEN 
DEFFIRENT IDS USING NSL-KDD DATASET 
Additionally, given the columns in PCC and NCC matrices 
are 
PCC
jS  and 
NCC
jS respectively. We use the covariance of 
these two columns to illustrate the significant difference as 
shown in (22). 
( , ) [( )( )]PCC NCC PCC PCC NCC NCCj j j j j jCov S S E S ES S ES    (22) 
It should be noticed that the correlation coefficient 
matrices are symmetric. Therefore, the dimension of 
columns that we need to calculate the covariance decreases 
gradually.  
VI. Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper has introduced a Nonlinear Correlation 
Coefficient (NCC) measure for discrete variables which is 
designed based on Mutual Information (MI). We have 
proposed an intrusion detection algorithm based on the 
assumption that intrusion behaves differently between 
normal network traffic. To equip our intrusion detection 
algorithm with high accuracy in recognizing deviation of an 
attack from the normal traffic flow, we have adopted the 
NCC into detection algorithm to extract the correlation 
between network traffic records. This makes our algorithm 
not only feasible in linear correlation extraction but also 
nonlinear correlation extraction. 
We have also verified our findings by experimentation 
and comparison with Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
(PCC) measure. The experimental results have shown that 
NCC-based intrusion detection algorithm achieves not only 
lower false positive rate but also higher detection rate than 
those of PCC-based intrusion detection algorithm. 
However, the proposed intrusion detection scheme still 
needs to be further studied in some aspects. For instance, we 
will consider when an attack occurs and what type of an 
attack is. These are the research objectives in our future 
works. In addition, we are going to apply our approach on a 
large sized enterprise network. 
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Figure 1.  The flow chart of the proposed algorithm 
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(a) Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient-based Correlation Matrix 
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(b) Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient-based Correlation Matrix 




Figure 3.  False positive rate for various threshold values on the training 
dataset 
B. Tables 
TABLE I.  ATTACK DISTRIBUTION IN NSL-KDD DATASET (OLUSOLA 
ET AL., 2010)     




































590 19 251 169 365 162 
1980 1556 3536 
 









1840 19 1566 1313 988 1761 
14590 7487 22077 
 
TABLE IV.  DETECTION RATE FOR VARIOUS THRESHOLD VALUES ON 
THE TRAINING DATASET 
Type of 
records 
Threshold   
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Normal 95.81% 97.57% 99.85% 99.94% 100% 
Teardrop 100% 99.41% 99.41% 98.22% 94.08% 
Smurf 100% 99.60% 99.60% 98.41% 97.61% 
Pod 100% 100% 100% 100% 98.76% 
Neptune 99.83% 99.66% 99.66% 99.32% 98.81% 
Back 99.45% 99.45% 99.18% 98.35% 97.26% 
Land 100% 100% 100% 95% 95% 
 





Normal 1977 3 99.84 
Attack 7 1549 99.55 




Normal TP FN 






















TABLE VII.  COMPARISON OF DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM BETWEEN 






NCC-MI (Proposed method) 1.246 98.754 
PCC 2.367 97.632 
Naïve Bayes Tree (Bhat et al., 
2013) 
2.0 ** 
SVM (de la Hoz et al., 2013) 93.4 14 
DM- Naïve Bayes (Panda et 
al., 2010) 
3.0 96.5 
Random Forest (Tavallaee et 
al., 2009) 
** 80.67 
** indicates data not provided by the author in their paper. 
